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Pursuant to Rule 50(e) of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, Appellants Robert and Joan DeBry submit this Reply
Brief.
III.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
WHETHER THE STATUTORY GRANT OF IMMUNITY
FOR GOVERNMENTAL ENTITIES ENGAGED IN PROPRIETARY
ON NON-GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTIONS VIOLATES THE OPEN
COURTS CLAUSE OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION IS AN ISSUE
THAT CAN AND SHOULD BE DECIDED BY THIS COURT
The County says that the statutory grant of immunity, in
Section 63-30-2(4)(c) was never an issue in this case.(Respondent's
Brief p. 12). The County's response is deceptive. Throughout this
litigation, the DeBrys argued that Section 63-30-4 violated the
open court's provision. In addition, the DeBrys argued that under
Standiford v. Salt Lake City Corp.. 605 P.2d 1230 (Utah 1980),
enforcement of the building code was not a governmental function.
However, the Court of Appeals did not engage in any
Standiford analysis. Instead, it held:
[S]ection 63-30-4 grants sovereign immunity to
state entities for all causes of action except
fraud and malice [and] does not violate
Article I Section 1 of the Utah Constitution.
Debry v. Salt Lake County, 188 Ut. Adv. Rep. 55, 57 (Utah
App 1992) (hereafter "Debry at
").
However, prior to the 1987 Governmental Immunity Act
amendments, Section 63-30-4 did not bar all causes of action except
fraud and malice. (Petition for Certiorari pp. 7-9). Section 63-304 barred all claims only after the legislature changed the
definition of a governmental function by enacting Section § 63-30-2
(4)(c).
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In summary, under common law, the DeBrys win. (Petition
for Certiorari pp 7-9). Under a Standiford analysis, summary
judgment is impossible. (Petition for Certiorari pp 6-7). However,
when the definition of a governmental function in Section 63-3 02(4)(c) is coupled with Section 63-30-4 the DeBrys lose. Thus,
this case presents an excellent opportunity to decide whether the
statutory grant of governmental immunity for proprietary or nongovernmental functions violates the open court's clause of Utah's
Constitution.
POINT II
DEBRYS DO NOT SEEK TO
CREATE A NEW RIGHT OF ACTION
The County says the all encompassing statutory grant of
sovereign immunity does not violate the open court's provisions of
Utah's Constitution because Article I Section 11 "worked no changes
in the principle of sovereign immunity" and was not meant to create
a new remedy or a new right of action (Respondent's Brief p. 7).
The Court of Appeals said the same thing. DeBry at 57. The County
does not identify the claimed new right or action. Nor does it
explain what principle of sovereign immunity the DeBrys seek to
change.
At common law the County and its chief building inspector
were liable. (Petition for Certiorari pp.7-9). Moreover, Utah's
governmental immunity statute was copied from Michigan. Michigan
Courts held that building inspections are not protected. Brand v.
Hartman. 332 N.W. 2d 479 (Mich. App. 1983). In short, the DeBrys
Petition is not based on a new right or on new principle of
sovereign immunity advocated by them. Rather, the Petition focuses
on a new principle of sovereign immunity adopted by the legislature
when it changed the governmental function definition.
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POINT III
WHETHER THE COUNTY'S FAILURE TO FOLLOW,
ENFORCE AND COMPLY WITH ITS BUILDING CODE
IS A CORE GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTION PROTECTED BY
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY IS AN OPEN ISSUE
The County's failure to follow and enforce its Building
Code does not involve core governmental functions protected by
governmental immunity. (Petition for Certiorari pp. 7-9.) The
County's response is a rehash of the Court of Appeals Analysis. The
Court of Appeals ruled that the DeBrys' claims arise out of an
activity set forth in Utah Code Ann. §63-30-10(1) (c) . DeBry. at
58. The Court then said:
The Supreme Court of Utah has held as a matter
of law, that those functions expressly
enumerated in Section 63-30-10 are core
governmental function. . . . (Condemarin v.
University Hospital, 775 P.2d 348, 350, (Utah
1989).
However, this Court in Condemarin held no such thing.
"The holding of the [Condemarim Court is limited to the following:
the recovery limits statutes are unconstitutional as applied to
University Hospital." Condemarin at 366.
The Condemarin language relied upon by both the County
and the Court of Appeals is dicta in Part I of Judge Durham's
opinion. None of the other four justices concurred in Part I of the
Condemarin opinion. Condemarin. at 366, 369, 375.
In summary, neither Condemarin nor the other cases cited
by the County resolve the issue of whether the County's failure to
follow and enforce its building code is a protected governmental
function.

3

POINT IV
THE RELATED ISSUES OF WHETHER THE DEBRYS HAVE BEEN
DENIED THEIR RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS AND RIGHT TO A JURY
TRIAL ARE ISSUES THAT ARE PROPERLY PRESENTED TO THE COURT
The DeBrys, alleged that when the County evicted them,
the County deprived them of their property interests guaranteed by
the First, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution (Exhibit 1) .
The First, Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments prohibit the County from retaliating against the DeBrys
for exercising their constitutional rights. See Blackledae v.
Perry. ( 417 U.S. 2, 1971). In this case, the DeBrys were evicted
after they filed a notice of claim with Salt Lake County (Exhibits
2 and 3.)
When the County moved for Summary Judgment, it did not
set forth any facts contesting the retaliation claim. (Exhibit 3).
Moreover, its constitutional argument was limited to: (1) the
DeBrys damages "are a result of their own actions, not those of the
County (Exhibit 4 p. 14), and (2) the enforcement of the building
code is an exercise of police power. (Exhibit 4 p. 14).
Since the retaliation issue was not raised, the DeBrys
were not required to respond. Rule 4-501(2) of the Code of Judicial
Administration. However, that did not stop the trial court from
throwing out all of the DeBrys claims. The Court said:
The plaintiffs have not been deprived of their
First, Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment rights
under the United States Constitution by virtue
of Salt Lake Countyfs having issued a Notice
and Order to vacate the plaintifffs premises.
DeBry at 58
On appeal, the DeBrys challenged the unsupported finding
(Appellants1 brief pp. 39-43, Exhibit 5). Debrys also said that
whether the County retaliated against the Debrys was a factual
question. (Id). Had the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the
4

record lacks support for the lower Court's finding of no
constitutional violation, the DeBrys would have their day in court.
However, the Court of Appeals did not do that. Instead it said:
[T]he DeBrys fail to establish nor does the
record indicate that the County engaged in any
retaliatory
action
against
the
DeBrys
following the filing of their Complaint.
DeBry at 59. The record did not indicate retaliation because the
issue was never raised factually or legally by the County as
required by Rule 4-501.l
In summary, the case started out as an appeal of a
Summary Judgment lacking factual and legal support. However, the
Court of Appeals by sanctioning the baseless finding of the trial
court raises the important issue of whether the DeBrys have been
denied their right to due process and a jury trial. The DeBrys
Petition timely raises these important issues.
IV.
CONCLUSION
Contrary to the assertion set forth in the County's
brief, the DeBrys have raised three important questions of state
law which are not settled and should be resolved by this Court.
Certiorari is warranted under 46(b) and (d).
DATED this (&
day of
$ crTdlo^e^^
1992.
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Plaintiff

EDWARD T. WELLS
Evidence of retaliation exists. See Petition for Certiorari
pp. 14-15. The facts set forth in the Petition were stricken from
Appellant's brief because they were developed after the Summary
Judgment was granted.
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BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that four true and correct copies of the
foregoing REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR CERTIORARI

(DeBry

v. Wallace Noble, et al) were mailed, postage prepaid, on the
fc>>^ day of October, 1992, to the following:
Paul G. Maughan
Deputy Salt Lake County Attorney
2001 South State St., S-3400
Salt Lake City, UT 84190-3421

SP35-065\jn

EXHIBIT 1

LEONARD E. McGEE - A2185
ROBERT J. DEBRY - A0849
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
4001 South 700 East, Fifth Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah
84107
Telephone: (801) 262-8915
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT J. DEBRY and JOAN DEBRY,
Plaintiffs,

SECOND REVISED
SUBSTITUTE THIRD
AMENDED COMPLAINT

vs,
CASCADE ENTERPRISES a general
partnership; DEL K. BARTEL;
DALE THURGOOD; ROBERT G. HILL;
UTAH TITLE AND ABSTRACT CO.;
CASCADE CONSTRUCTION, a general
partnership; LEE ALLEN BARTEL;
SALMON AND ALDER, INC.; WILLIAM
TRIGGER d.b.a. TRIGGER ROOFING;
ZEPHYR ELECTRIC, INC.; SAWYER
GLASS CO., INC.; TRIAD SERVICES
CO., INC.; VALLEY MORTGAGE
CORP., INC.; RICHARDS-WOODBURY
MORTGAGE CORP.; WALLACE R.
NOBLE, individually and in his
official capacity SALT LAKE
COUNTY; SCOTT McDONALD REALTY,
INC.; STANLEY POSTMA; TRI-K
CONTRACTORS; KEN BAR MANUFACTURING COMPANY; GRANDEUR HOMES;
BUILDERS COMPONENTS; SOTERKNUDSEN; VAN ELLSWORTH dba
DRAFTING UNLIMITED; CANADA LIFE
INSURANCE COMPANY; BUILDING
SYSTEMS, INC., and FIDELITY
NATIONAL TITLE INSURANCE CO.,

Civil No. C86-553

JUDGE PAT BRIAN

Defendants.

nr r pfisv

VIOLATIONS OF STATUTES AND ORDINANCES

31.

Defendants Cascade Enterprises, Thurgood, and

Bartel violated §5 8A-la-4f Utah Code Annotated in that they
acted as contractors without a license.
32.

Defendants Cascade Enterprises, Bartel, and

Thurgood violated Sec. 2-1-1, Salt Lake County Ordinances,
of January 14, 1983 (Uniform Building Code 5303(a)) in that
they did not obtain any "approved" plans and specifications
from Salt Lake County officials.
33.

Defendants

Cascade Enterprises, Bartel and

Thurgood violated Sec. 2-1-1 Salt Lake County Ordinances of
January 14, 1983

(Uniform Building Code 5301(a)) in that

they

the building without

constructed

a valid

building

permit.
34.

Defendants Cascade Enterprises, Bartel and

Thurgood violated Sec. 2-1-1 Salt Lake County Ordinances of
January 14, 1983

(Uniform Building Code §303(a)) in that

they did not do the work in accordance with plans approved
by Salt Lake County.
35.

Defendants

Cascade

Enterprises, Bartel and

Thurgood violated Sec. 2-1-1 Salt Lake County Ordinances of
January 14, 1983 (Uniform Building Code §305) in that they
did not request or obtain all of the inspections required by
Salt Lake County.
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36.

Defendants

Cascade

Enterprises,

Bartel

and

Thurgood violated Sec. 2-1-1 Salt Lake County Ordinances of
January

14, 1983

(Uniform Building Code

§202 (d)) in that

they constructed the building during the pendency of a "stop
order."
37.

Defendants

Cascade

Enterprises,

Bartel

and

Thurgood violated Sec. 2-1-8 of the Salt Lake County Ordinances of January 14, 1983, in that they proceeded with the
work

without

obtaining

separate

plumbing

and

mechanical

permits.
38.

Defendants

Cascade

Enterprises,

Bartel

and

Thurgood have violated §58-la-13, Utah Code Ann., by maintaining an action for damages notwithstanding the fact that
none of them are licensed contractors.

DEFECTS

39.

After the closing, plaintiffs found numerous

defects in the building.
reasonably

discovered

These defects could not have been

prior

to

closing.

These

defects

include, but are not limited to, the following:
(a)

All items listed in the certified letter from
the Chief Building Official dated March 19,
1986.

A true copy of this letter is attached

as Exhibit L hereto.
(b)

All other defects as described in paragraph
51, below•
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(c)

The cooling capacity provided

for the lower

floor is far below that necessary to cool the
building.

As a result, the cooling on the

lower level is uneven and insufficient.
(d)

The supply duct is far below industry standards

in

size.

This

generates

static

pressure throughout the duct system in excess
of what the rooftop and
capable

of

delivering

furnace system are
air

through.

This

results in uneven distribution of supply air
and inadequate air flow.
(e)

The diffusers are inadequate to deliver air
at a noise level less than NC-35 which is the
industry standard.

(f)

The roof has no drains.

If the roof is not

run dead flat, drains are necessary.

If the

roof is not run dead flat, the roof life is
compromised.
standard

In either case, roof drains are

practice

to

protect

the

roof

and

floor

are

prevent structural overload.
(g)

Air

supply

introduced

grilles
at

on

floor

the

level

first

generating

cold

stratification near the floor which is below
the industry standard.
(h)

There are interior and exterior spaces in the
same heating/cooling
heating/cooling

zones.

uneven

9

and

This makes the
makes

it impos-

sible to

simultaneously

temperature

in both

maintain

interior

the

and

same

exterior

spaces which is below the industry standard.
(i)

Almost all return air grilles are located in
interior spaces and no returns are in exterior spaces.

This causes stale and stagnant

air conditions whenever interior doors are
closed which is below the industry standard.
(j)

Flexible

ductwork

has

been

used

almost

exclusively for branch ducts in the second
floor.
below

The ductwork has been run in a manner
the

industry

standard,

both

length of run and straightness of run.

as

to

This

creates excessive static pressure loss whichf
when combined with the undersizing of the
ducts, makes adequate heating and cooling of
the building almost impossible.
(k)

The furnace is not located in a 1-hour fire
rated enclosure which is a violation of the
Uniform Building Code.

(1)

The structural steel of the exit has not been
completely primed and painted.

(m)

Earth has been placed directly against the TS
3-1/2 X 3/1/2 X 1/4 columns at ground level.

(n)

Non-structural 1/2" diameter bolts were used
to connect channel stringers to the elevated
landing.
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(o)

A footing was not constructed for the low end
of the stairway.

(p)

Non-bearing

steel

stud

partitions

were

installed without a gap between the top of
the walls and the bottom chord of the trusses.
(q)

From one to three 3/4" diameter through bolts
were missing in the majority of beam saddles.

(r)

Footings do not have adequate frost depth at
the north entrance, west entrance and east
center window.

(s)

The upstairs northwest corner room windows
are not square, plumb and level.

(t)

The conference room windows in the northwest
corner are loose and

lack proper settling

blocks, gaskets, and installation.
(u)

The glazing of the windows in the copy room
is broken.

(v)

The

glass wall

of

the

entrance

lobby

is

leaking water.
(w)

The

glass mullion

lobby

is

not

system

designed

in
for

the

entrance

the

existing

structural loading and span.
(x)

The mullion system is not self-guttering or
otherwise protected from water infiltration,
and thus leaks in several places.

(y)

There is no drainage for a window on the east
side lower level, causing water leakage.
11

(z)

Toilet partitions are not installed.

(aa) Exposed wood en the parapet is not covered by
counter-flashing.
(bb) Steel

headers

over

the

windows

are

not

painted.
(cc) Flashing on the parapet wall is not joined
properly and will leak,
(dd) The gutters on the south side do not drain
properly and leak over the electrical switch
panels.
(ee) Soffit material under

the windows

is not

finished.
(ff) Fresh air inlet on the south side is not
installed properly.
(gg) There is no insulation

in the walls, nor

between the first floor ceiling and the floor
above, nor behind the spandrel glass areas.
(hh) There

is

1-1/2

inches

perlite

board

for

exterior wall insulation, which is inadequate
according to the Utah Energy Code,
(ii) Handicap handrails are not installed in the
restrooms.
(jj) West side exterior stairway is not painted,
nor does it have footings or a landing.
general, it is structurally highly unsafe.
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In

(kk) The

roof

flashings

is

not

are

properly

not

installed.

properly

The

installed

or

practical, nor is the corner flashing properly installed.
40.

After

the closing, plaintiffs

found

in the

building numerous violations of applicable building codes.
These violations could not have been reasonably discovered
prior to closing.
references

are

These violations are as follows.

to

the

Uniform

Building

Code,

(All

National

Electric Code, Uniform Mechanical Code, and Uniform Plumbing
Code, all as adopted by Salt Lake County in Ordinance 838.)
(a)

The distance between the exits on the second
level is 48 feet. (U.B.C. 53303(c).)

(b)

The

stair

length

of

greater than 12 feet.
(c)

The wallboard
does

not

(U.B.C.

the

1

§3305(2)

HR
and

stairs

is

(U.B.C. §3306(i).)

installation

meet

center

in

rating

the

hallways

requirements.

Table No.

43-B,

Item

not

fire

71.)
(d)

Fixtures
rated.

(e)

and

ceiling

grills

(U.B.C. §4303(a)(6).)

The required fire protection or fire dampers
have not been installed
in the ceiling.

(f)

are

for all penetration

(U.B.C. §4303(a)(6).)

The doors are not 20-minute fire rated, nor
do they have door closers, smoke seals, or
fire rated frames.
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(U.B.C. §3305 (h).)

(g)

The upstairs restroom door swings into an
existing way, and entering traffic, allowing
a

width

of

only

14

inches.

(U.B.C.

53305(d).)
(h)

The upstairs west exit door requires exit
through

an

adjoining

room

and, therefore,

does not provide for a continuous exit way.
(U.B.C. §3305(a).)
(i)

The upstairs west exit door has no means to
exit without a key when the door is locked.
(U.B.C. §3304(d).)

(j)

The hallway for the office on the east side
upstairs is more than 20 feet long.

(U.B.C.

53305(e).)
(k)

The front door has no exit device or sign to
remain open during working hours, nor means
to

exit without

locked.
(1)

a

key

when

the door

is

(U.B.C. 53304(c).)

No draft stops in ceiling space.

(U.B.C.

52516(f).)
(m)

The suspended ceiling and light fixtures are
not anchored properly

for seismic bracing.

(N.E.C. §4010-16.)
(n)

Service entrance conductors are 350 MCM THW
rated

for

310

amps

maximum.

(N.E.C.

230-90(a); N.E.C. 240-3 Exc. No. 1.)
(o)

Ground electrode conductor to water pipe is
only #2 gauge wire.
14

(N.E.C. Table 250-94.)

(p)

Ground electrode conductor is exposed for 18"
from

ground

rod

to

conduit.

(N.E.C.

250-92(a).)
(q)

Neither the conductor to the v;ater pipe nor
the conductor to the ground

rod have been

bonded to the conduit at the end opposite
from

the

equipment

enclosure.

(N.E.C.

250-92(a).)
(r)

The auxiliary gutter is only 6 inches wide.
(N.E.C. 370-18.)

(s)

The overcurrent protection for the 200 amp
feeders to each of the panel boards is 225
amps. (N.E.C. 240-3.)

(t)

Panel B is protected by a 225 amp breaker.
(N.E.C. 384-16(a).)

(u)

The bending radius of the 3/0 conduction in
the two panels is less than three inches.
(N.E.C. 300-34.)

(v)

Each panel has been field modified to accommodate a 225-amp

side mount main breaker,

which does not meet code required minimum
bending space.
(w)

A blue conductor has been used as a neutral
conductor.

(:;)

(N.E.C. 373-6(a).)

(N.E.C. 210-5(a)• )

One of the panels has been used as an enclosure

for

splicing

conductors

which

through conduit to another panel.
300-15(a).)
15

pass

(N.E.C.

(y)

The

receptacles

as

presently

installed

without bonding jumpers are not approved for
grounding.
(z)

(N.E.C. 250-74.)

Light fixtures are not secured to the ceiling
framing member.

(N.E.C. 410-16 (c).)

(aa) Orange conductor has been used as a grounding
conductor.

(N.E.C. 210-5(b).)

(bb) Grounding conductor has been terminated on
screws used to attach cover plates.

(N.E.C.

250-114(a).)
(cc) Flexible metal conduit lengths longer than 6
feet

have

not

been

supported.

(N.E.C.

350-4.)
(dd) The conduits run above the ceiling are not
property supported.

(N.E.C. 348-12.)

(ee) Outside conduit has been installed partly on
fenceposts
required

and

partly

support.

on

(N.E.C.

earth

without

346-12;

Table

outside

where

300-5.)
(ff) Flexible

conduit

is

used

exposed to physical damage.
(gg) Supports

are

not

provided

conduit to lightpoles.

(N.E.C. 351-4.)
for

flexible

(N.E.C. 351-8.)

(hh) Some outdoor junction boxes are located under
the

fence

and

are

removing the fence.
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not

accessible

(N.E.C. 370-19.)

without

(ii) No

enclosures

have

been

installed

around

recessed fixtures mounted in the lobby and
exits to maintain

fire rating of ceiling.

(U.B.C. 4303-6.)
(jj) The

contractor

has

installed

a

non-fused

disconnect switch at the condenser unit, and
has

used

non-KACR

panelboard.

rated

breakers

in

the

This voids the UL labelling on

the condenser.

(N.E.C. 110-3(a).)

(kk) The panels installed were listed UL with main
lugs only.
a

main

Modifying these panels by adding

breaker

has

voided

the UL label.

(N.E.C. 110-3(a).)
(11) There is not 5 cfm of outside air per occupant as required by the Uniform Mechanical
Code, §605.

In fact, there is no outside

air.
(mm) The building requires two water closets and
lavoratories in each women's restroom; and
two lavoratories, one urinal and one water
closet

in

the

men's

restroom.

(Uniform

Plumbing Code, Appendix C.)
(nn) The ledger bolts next to the 8-foot windows
are overloaded by a factor of 7.3 for live
load, partition load and dead load.
2510(b).)
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(U.B.C.

(oo) The ledger bolts described above are overloaded for dead load by a factor of 1.6, and
therefore, the second floor cannot support
any

live

or

partition

load.

(U.B.C.

2510(b)•)
(pp) There was no floor or roof diaphragm design.
(U.B.C. 2312(j)2C.)
(qq) There v;as no sub-diaphragm design or construction.

(U.B.C. 2312 (j)2C.)

(rr) The edges of the large rectangular opening at
the front entrance of the first floor do not
have

reinforcement

stresses.

to

transfer

shearing

(U.B.C. 2513(a).)

(ss) The roof and floor diaphragm connections to
the masonry walls use toenails, and subject
the 2" X 12" ledgers to cross-grain bending
and tension.

(U.B.C. 2310 and 2312(j)3A.)

(tt) The roof and floor diaphragm boundaries do
not have positive connection to the respective

diaphragm

chords

and

masonry

walls.

(U.B.C. 2310 and 2513(a).)
(uu) The first floor ledgers acting as diaphragm
chords between masonry walls cannot carry the
required
forces.
(w) Perimeter
stressed

tensile

and

compression

chord

(U.B.C. 2513(c) and 2312(j)2C.)
masonry
in

shear

shear
and

walls
are

not

are

over-

adequately

reinforced for seismic overturning movement.
18

Furthermore, installed vertical

reinforcing

is less than the #5 at 32" O.C. called for in
the

drawings.

connection

in

There
places

is
by

no

the

positive
reinforcing

between the masonry and concrete foundation.
One place where this was not done in the
southeast

storage room

is critical to the

overall seismic integrity of the building.
(U.B.C. 2312(f) and Table No. 24-H, 4(b).)
(ww) The two through bolts that anchor the east
side of the west exit landing to the building
are overloaded by a factor of 5.3 for live
and dead load.

(U.B.C. Table No. 23-A.)

(xx) There are a number of job modified trusses,
trusses with eccentric bearings and a broken
truss.

The

press

plates

of

a number

of

trusses had been bent back upon itself 1-1/2"
- 1-3/4".

As a result of these defects, the

trusses in the floor and roof cannot carry
the load capacity required

by the Uniform

Building Code.
(yy) Nail spacings on the roof and floor sheathing
are

sporadic

and

often

exceed

6 inches.

(U.B.C. Table No. 25-J.)
(zz) Nailhead generally fractured the surface of
the sheathing.

(U.B.C. 2513(a)).
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PLAINTIFFS' FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
AGAINST DEFENDANTS WALLACE,
RAY NOBLE, SALT LAKE COUNTY
PUBLIC WORKS DEPT., AND SALT LAKE COUNTY
NEGLIGENCE
41.

Wallace Ray Noble was at all times relevant to

this complaint the Chief Building Official to the Development
Services Division of the Salt Lake County Public Works Department,
42.

Defendant Salt Lake County had a duty to

enforce certain statutes and regulations as alleged in
paragraphs 31 through 38, above in that such statutes and
regulations were promulgated for the protection of plaintiffs
and other members of the general public.
43.

Defendant Salt Lake County failed to enforce

the said statutes and regulations.
44.

By reason of the failure of defendant Salt Lake

County to enforce the said statutes and regulations, the
building was constructed with the various defects alleged in
paragraphs 39 and 40f above; and the construction on the
building continued notwithstanding a valid "stop work" order.
45.

Defendants Salt Lake County and Wallace Ray

Noble had actual or constructive knowledge of the various
violations of statutes and ordinances alleged in paragraphs
3 3-40 above.

Furthermore, defendants Salt Lake County and

Wallace Ray Noble had actual or constructive knowledge that
plaintiffs believed that all statutes and ordinances had been
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satisfied, and that plaintiffs relied thereon in purchasing
the building.
46.

Defendant Salt Lake County conducted certain

inspections of the building, and in the course of such inspections, Salt Lake County discovered some or all of the violations alleged in paragraphs 31-3 8, above, and some or all of
the defects alleged in paragraphs 39, 40, above, below.
Notwithstanding this actual knowledge, defendants failed to
require the contractors and builders to correct the defects
and violations.

Furthermore, defendant Salt Lake County

failed to warn plaintiffs and other members of the general
public of the defects and violations.

Finally, defendants

failed to stop the construction of the building.
47.

Defendant Salt Lake County, through its agent

Wallace Ray Noble, issued a "temporary certificate of occupancy" without making any inspection.

Either before or after

issuing the temporary certificate of occupancy, Salt Lake
County had actual knowledge that no building permit had ever
been issued, and that certain portions of the building did not
meet the requirements of the U.B.C.

Furthermore, Salt Lake

County and Wallace Ray Noble had actual knowledge that plaintiffs were preparing to finalize their purchase in reliance
upon the fact that a building permit had been issued, and in
reliance on the fact that the temporary certificate of occupancy was bona fide.

Notwithstanding this actual knowledge,

Salt Lake County and Wallace Ray Noble failed to revoke the
temporary certificate of occupancy, and failed to advise
plaintiffs of the defect.
21

48.

By reason of Salt Lake County's and Wallace Ray

Noble's conduct, alleged above, plaintiffs closed the sale on
a building which is neither habitable nor fit for its intended
use as an office building.

If the contract between plaintiff

and Cascade Enterprises is not rescinded, plaintiffs will be
damaged by the cost of repairing the defects and the costs of
maintaining litigation against third parties.

These costs

have not yet been ascertained.

PLAINTIFFS' SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
AGAINST DEFENDANT NOBLE, SALT LAKE COUNTY
PUBLIC WORKS DEPT., AND SALT LAKE COUNTY
FRAUD
49.

Defendant Noble, acting as agent for Salt Lake

County, issued a temporary certificate of occupancy on the
premises at 4252 South 700 East.
50.

The signed temporary certificate of occupancy

was a representation to the citizens of Salt Lake County that:
(a)

Salt Lake County has "approved" the plans
pursuant to §303 (a) of the Uniform Building
Code;

(b)

A valid building permit has been issued
pursuant to §303 (a), Uniform Building Code;

(c)

That all inspections required by §305 (a) of the
Uniform Building Code have been conducted;
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(d)

That no work has been done on the building
beyond the point indicated in each successive
inspection without first obtaining the approval
of the building inspector as required by
5305(d), Uniform Building Code;

(e)

That all work on the building has been done in
accordance with the "approved" plans as
required by §303(a) of the Uniform Building
Code;

(f)

That the building official has made a special
finding that no substantial hazard would result
from occupancy of the building as required by
§307(d) of the Uniform Building Code.

51.

Each of the foregoing representations was false

(a)

Salt Lake County has not "approved" the plans

in that:

pursuant to §303(a) of the Uniform Building
Code;
(b)

A valid building permit has not been issued
pursuant to §303(a) , Uniform Building Code;

(c)

That all inspections required by §305(a) of the
Uniform Building Code have not been conducted;

(d)

That work was done on the building beyond the
point indicated in each successive inspection
without first obtaining the approval of the
building inspector as required by §305(d),
Uniform Building Code;
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(e)

That not all work on the building has been done
in accordance with the "approved" plans as
required by §303(a) of the Uniform Building
Code;

(f)

That the building official has not made a
special finding that no substantial hazard
would result from occupancy of the building as
required by §307(d) of the Uniform Building
Code.

52.

Defendant Noble and defendant Salt Lake County

had actual knowledge that the representations were false when
the temporary certificate of occupancy was issued; or in the
alternativef defendants Noble and Salt Lake County had actual
knowledge that the representations were false immediately
after the temporary certificate of occupancy was issued, and
said defendants failed to rescind or revoke or withdraw the
representation.
53.

Plaintiffs relied on the said representations

by completing their purchase of the building and occupying the
premises.
54.

Plaintiffs were damaged in that the

representations were false and the building is neither
habitable nor fit for its intended use.

If the contract

between plaintiffs and Cascade is not rescindedf plaintiffs
will be damaged by the cost of repairing the premises which is
not yet ascertained.
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PLAINTIFFS1 THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
AGAINST DEFENDANT NOBLE, SALT LAKE
COUNTY PUBLIC WORKS, AND SALT LAKE COUNTY
55.

Defendant Noble, acting under color of State

lav;, issued a temporary certificate of occupancy to plaintiffs, thereby representing that the building was safe for
human habitation.
56.

Plaintiffs believed Noble's representations

that the building was safe for human habitation and plaintiffs, therefore, effected a purchase.
57.

Thereafter, Salt Lake County evicted plaintiffs

from the building on the grounds that it was not safe for
human habitation.
58.

As a direct result of the notice to vacate,

plaintiffs have been deprived of their liberty within the
meaning of the 1st and 14th Amendments, in that their freedom
of enterprise and occupation has been taken away.
59.

As a further result of the notice to vacate,

plaintiffs have been deprived of their property within the
meaning of the 5th and 14th Amendments, in that they have been
wrongfully deprived of the use of their building.
60.

As a further result of the notice to vacate,

plaintiffs have been deprived of equal protection of the laws,
within the meaning of the 14th Amendment.
61.

As a direct and proximate result of the de-

privation of the Constitutional rights listed above, plaintiffs have been damaged in that they have lost the use of
25

their property and their freedom to pursue their occupation.
Plaintiffs have further been damaged in that they purchased a
building which is defective and uninhabitable in reliance on
defendant's representation that the building was fit for
occupancy.

If the contract between plaintiffs and Cascade

Enterprises is not rescinded, plaintiffs will have been
damaged in the cost of making repairs to the building, the
amount of which is not presently known.

PLAINTIFFS1 FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
AGAINST DEFENDANT SCOTT McDONALD
62.

Defendant Scott McDonald Realty, Inc., is a

real estate agent and broker.
63.

Defendant Scott McDonald Realty, Inc., ap-

proached plaintiffs with the proposition to purchase the
building.

In so doing, defendant McDonald acted as agent for

the seller.
64.

Plaintiffs paid defendant Scott McDonald

Realty, Inc., in excess of $20,000 in commissions.
65.

Defendant Scott McDonald Realty, Inc., had a

duty to determine the accuracy of the information in the
listing agreement and otherwise, to be honest, ethical and
competent in all of his dealings with plaintiffs.
66.

Defendant Scott McDonald Realty, Inc., knew or

should have known that neither Cascade Enterprises nor Cascade
Construction had any contractor's license nor any building
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EXHIBIT 2

&252 J^A.
CTMJC -ZJIA*,

700 tiaU

~Guty,' UCaAs

801 2 6 2 - 8 9 1 5

May 13,1986
Personal Service and
Certified Mail

NOTICE OF CLAIM
TO:

^^E^^^J^^^^^^^^^SS^T^^OO^

407,

Salt Lake City & County Building,
Salt Lake City, Utah and
teaM&a^
and
as representative of Salt Lake
County Public Works Department
Gentlemen:
On or about December 13, 1985, Robert and Joan De3ry
closed

the

sale

of

a building

they were purchasing.

The

building they purchased is located at 4252 South 700 East in
Salt Lake County.

To close the sale, Joan DeBry and Robert

DeBry paid Cascade Enterprises $550,577.93 in cash and executed
a note in the face amount of $62,500.00.

The note is subject

to an agreement that allows reduction of the note under certain
circumstances.

The note is now subject to litigation between

the DeBrys and Cascade Enterprises.

Part of the cash came from

a $500,000.00 loan claimants obtained from Richards-Woodbury
Mor'. rrace Co.
In addition to-these sums, claimants paid $21,000.00
in

real

estate

$61,945.83

extra

commissions
financing,

building they purchased.

and

have

finishing

spent
antf

not

less

than

repairing

the

Liens totallinc S6,791.11 have been
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placed against the property.

The total amount that claimants

have spent or may be held liable for as a result of their
purchase is not less than $702,820.83.

The expenses incurred

by claimants have not been - fully calculated

and continue to

accrue.
A specific condition of the agreement between the
DeBrys and Cascade Enterprises was that the DeBrys would be
furnished with a valid Certificate of Occupancy before they
would have any obligation to close.
Del B-axtel, one
Wallace

Ray

To meet this condition,

of Cascade Enterprises' partners

Noble

to

issue

a

temporary

persuaded

certificate

occupancy, a copy of which:is attached as Exhibit "A".

of

Based

upon this, the De3rys and their lender, Richards-Woodbury, went
through with the closing.
This

temporary

certificate was

issued

without the

required inspections set forth in the Building Code.

In fact,

it was issuec even though Cascade Enterprises and those working
for it had

only

obtained

a footing

and

foundation permit.

Furthermore, the required set of approved plans was not filed
with Salt Lake County by the builders.

Wallace Ray Noble knew,

or should have known, when he issued the temporary certificate
that

the

building

was built without

required

permits, the

required inspections, or the required set of approved plans.

NOTICE OF CLAIM
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He did not inform the DeBrys or their lender that required
inspections had not been conducted, or that required permits
had not been issued.

Because Del Bartel had informed him that

the

such

lender

required

a certificate, he

knew

that his

certificate was to be relied on in closing the sale.
After the DeBrys took possession of the premises,
they learned that the heating system was inferior to that set
forth

in

plans

Cascade

Enterprises

had

given

them.

They

learned that a major part of the cooling system was missing.
They Teamed of many other defects in the building including
those listed in the letter from Wallace Ray Noble, a copy of
which is attached as Exhibit "B".
Because of the significance of the defects and the
lack of the inspections which are contemplated by the building
permit process, the DeBrys have brought suit to rescind the
contract

with

Cascade

Enterprises.

Salt

Lake

County

and

Wallace Ray Noble are jointly liable with Cascade Enterprises
to restore claimants to the status quo which existed prior to
the date of the temporary occupancy certificate and are liable
to claimants in an amount equal to the sums plaintiffs have
expended and will spend on or in connection with the building
at 4252 South 700 East since December 7, 1985.

That amount has

not

no

yet

been

fully

ascertained.

Jt

is

less

$702,820. S3, and additional amounts have or will be soer.t.

than
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If claimants are unable to rescind the sale, or elect
not to do so, Salt Lake County and Wallace Ray Noble are liable
to claimants
fully

for damages.

calculated

but

These damages have not yet been

they

include

damages

for

loss

of

marketability of the building in an unknown amount, damages in
an amount equal to the cost of conducting the inspections that
would

have been

conducted

had

the correct building

permit

procedure been followed, and the expenses incurred by claimants
to

correct

defects

in the

building.

The

amount

of

these

damages have not yet been determined.
Claimants have an estimate that the cost of bringing
the heating and "air conditioning up to a reasonable standard is
between S28,476.64 and $38,184.52.

The cost of circuit break-

ers which remain to be installed is $613.00 for parts only.
retaining wall needs to be raised along the north side.

A
It

will cost no less than $364.00 to raise the one foot along the
north side.

Liens totalling $6,791.11 have been placed against

the property.

It will take between $325 to $800 to finish the

roof, excluding leak repairs.

Claimants have spent at least

S23,542.42 on matters which claimants claim Cascade Enterprises
had the responsibility to perform and on items for which the
appropriation

of

the amount of the allowance

given by the

NOTICE OF CLAIM
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contractor
presently

is disputed.
have

estimates

Thus, total damages that claimants
or

documentation

on

could

total

$67,295.55.
This figure does not include costs of repairing the
cement parking lot, the costs of repairing additional leaks in
the roof, the cost of repairing other contact breaches, the
cost of completing all the things that need to be completed,
the loss of marketability, the cost of conducting inspections
that Should have been conducted, the extras wrongly charged
claimants or other damages.

For the purpose of this claim,

claimants* estimate the total damages at $300,000 if damages
instead of recision are awarded.
In addition to the negligent conduct alleged above,
it is further alleged that Salt Lake County did send inspectors out on some occasions to inspect the progress of the
building.

Those inspectors knew, or should have known, that no

building permit had been issued, and that no set of "approved"
plans had been filed with the County for the building.

Never-

theless, the said bulding inspectors failed to issue stop work
orders, and otherwise permitted the construction to continue.
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Claimants

assert

that

because

of

the

nature

of

Wallace Ray Noble's and Salt Lake County's actions, claimants
are not required to give notice under the Governmental Immunity
Act.

Nevertheless, claimants give this notice to insure that

the notice provisions of the Governmental Immunity Act will be
complied with in case a court would require it even under the
circumstances of this case.
DATED this

/&ytji

day of

//IA^)

1986.

ROBERT J. DEBRY for himself
and as agent and atto/nev
/
for
JOAN
" DEBRY
RJD/ek

EXHIBIT 3

S A L T
D E V E L O P M E N T

LAKE
COUNTY
S E R V I C E S
D I V I S I O N

1033 ?.»•><::!: Sc.-.:o ?:ro.*:
S e l l L:i!i.» '.'icy. rt.-«h . " i l l 5

3aStf

irf!,„

• «C V

L\n:c or S e r v i c e

N O T I C E A N D ORDER
To: Kr. Robert DeBry
*252 South 700 East
Salt Lake City, UT 8*107
He:

Office Building at 4252 South 700 East

Notice:

The referenced building is being occupied in violation cf
Section 307 (a) of the Uniform Building Code, in that there
is no valid "Certificate of Occupancy", the "Temporary
Certificate of Occupancy" issued December 6, 1985, has
expired, and the corrections required by this department en
Harch 19, 1986, subsequent to a requested inspection
performed by this department ha*L" r.n^frrr-rr.-nds.

Order:

Yoy^-ica hereby ordered tot^vacate the building within 10
^daj/s*X Furthermore, the buiicmg snaii rn.u«.l** «./...iiitLirl'
until such time as a valid "Certificate of Occupancy" is
issued.
A "Certificate of Occupancy" will be issued only after
submittal'and approval of as-built drawings, certification
from.a licensed engineer as to the adequacy of the
structure, payment of all fees prescribed by law, and a
final inspection showing compliance with code requirements.
The final inspection will not be performed until the
aforementioned administrative requirements have been met..
This order is issued under authoritv of Section 202 Ce) of
the Uniform Building Code.

Sincerely, /~\_^

CA*L ESIKSSCtf, Secrion Hanager
Inspection Services
CE/jb

cc:

Paul Haughn-, Deputy County Attorney

F1I F HflPY

\yv

y

EXHIBIT 4

DAVID E. YOCOM
Salt Lake County Attorney
By: Paul G. Maughan (No. 2124)
Deputy County Attorney
Attorneys for Salt Lake County Defendants
and Wallace R. Noble
231 East 400 South
Salt Lake City. Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 363-7900
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY. STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT J. DEBRY and JOAN DEBRY.
Plaintiffs,
-vsCASCADE ENTERPRISES, a general
partnership; DEL K. BARTEL;
DALE THURGOOD; ROBERT G. HILL;
UTAH TITLE- AND ABSTRACT CO.;
CASCADE CONSTRUCTION, a general
partnership; LEE ALLEN BARTEL;
SALMON AND ALDER, INC.; WILLIAM
TRIGGER d.b.a. TRIGGER ROOFING;
ZEPHYR ELECTRIC. INC.; SAWYER
GLASS CO., INC.; TRIAD SERVICES
CO.,
INC.; VALLEY MORTGAGE
CORP.. INC.; RICHARDS-WOODBURY
MORTGAGE CORP.; WALLACE R.
NOBLE, individually and in his
official capacity: SALT LAKE
COUNTY; SCOTT MCDONALD REALTY,
INC.;
STANLEY POSTMA; TRI-K
CONTRACTORS; KEN BAR MANUFACTURING COMPANY; GRANDEUR HOMES;
BUILDERS COMPONENTS; SOTERKNUDSEN; VAN ELLSWORTH dba
DRAFTING UNLIMITED; CANADA LIFE
INSURANCE COMPANY; BUILDING
SYSTEMS. INC., and FIDELITY
NATIONAL TITLE INSURANCE CO. ,

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
SALT LAKE COUNTY'S AND
WALLACE RAY NOBLE'S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Civil No. C86-553

Judge Pat Brian

Defendants.
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I
NATURE OF THE CASE
The

plaintiffs

have

filed

an

action

against

Salt

Lake

County, the Salt Lake County Public Works Department, and the
County's Building Official, Wallace Ray Noble, based upon the
latter's

issuance

of

a

thirty

day temporary

certificate of

occupancy for the building located at 4252 South 700 East, Salt
Lake City, Utah.
the

building,

The plaintiffs are subsequent purchasers of

and

have

initiated

this

action

for

various

alleged engineering and construction defects in the building.
II
FACTS
Defendants believe no issues of material fact exist in this
action.

The facts, viewed

in a light most

favorable to the

plaintiffs, demonstrate the following:
1.

Salt

Lake

County

issued

a footings

and

foundations

permit to Cascade Construction over the signature of Del Bartel
during the fall of 1984 for the premises located at 4252 South
700 East, Salt Lake City, Utah (hereinafter the property).
2.

During

the

course

of

construction

the

County

made

several inspections of the property.
3.

On December 6, 1985, at the request of Del Bartel and

Cascade Construction, and in reliance upon Bartel1s statements
that all necessary permits for the building had been obtained
by Cascade Construction,
County issued
Construction

the Building

Official

of Salt Lake

a temporary certificate of occupancy to Cascade
allowing

occupancy
-2-

of

the

building

for

thirty

days.
the

During this thirty day period. Cascade was to complete
building

inspection

and

and

meet

a

all

requirements

permanent

certificate

for
of

both

a

final

occupancy.

(See

Affidavit of Ray Noble-)
4.
that

Both

at the

the plaintiffs

and

time the temporary

the contractors

were

aware

certificate of occupancy was

issued on December 6, 1985, and on the day of closing December
10, 1985, that the building remained uncompleted and that each
had

a

responsibility

building.
entitled

(See

to

Exhibits

perform
F

and

additional

work

on

the

H of plaintiffs' complaint,

"Escrow and Non-Merger Agreement" dated December 10,

1985, attached hereto as Appendix A.)
5.

Plaintiffs also knew that the certificate of occupancy

was only temporary and required defendants Thurgood and Bartel
to

bond

for

any

work

required

for

plaintiffs

to

continue

occupancy of the building beyond the thirty days allowed by the
Building Official.
6.

(See paragraph 7 of Appendix A.)

The necessary steps for the completion of the building

and the issuance of a final certificate of occupancy were not
completed

within

said

thirty

days, nor have such conditions

been completed as of this date by either the builder or the
plaintiffs herein.
7.

(Affidavit of Ray Noble.)

The County, on several occasions, notified

both the

plaintiffs and the builder of the conditions required before a
final inspection can or will be made by Salt Lake County and a
determination

made

as

occupancy will be issued.

to

whether

a

final

certificate

(See Affidavit of Ray Noble.)
-3-

of

8.

On November

3, 1986 the County issued

plaintiffs

to

quit

the

a notice and

order

ordering

premises

within

ten

days.

The order was based upon the plaintiffs' and builder's

failure and refusal to correct building code violations in the
building, obtain a building permit, submit as-built drawings.
and pay required fees.

(See Exhibit D of Noble's Affidavit.)
ARGUMENT
POINT I

DEFENDANTS SALT LAKE COUNTY AND WALLACE R.
NOBLE ARE IMMUNE FROM SUIT PURSUANT TO THE
PROVISIONS OF THE GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT.
SECTION
63-30-1.
ET
SEQ..
UTAH
CODE
ANNOTATED.
The County and its Building Official are being sued on the
basis of the issuance of a temporary certificate of occupancy
which

permitted

the occupancy

thirty day period.

of plaintiff's

building for a

Noble is named as a defendant both in his

official capacity as a representative of Salt Lake County and
as an individual.
The plaintiffs' action against said defendants fails on the
basis of Utah's Governmental Immunity Act. Section 63-30-1. et
seq.f

Utah Code Annotated 1953. as amended, which provides in

relevant part:
11

Immunity from suit of all governmental
entities is waived for injury proximately
caused by a negligent act or omission of an
employee committed within the
scope of
employment except if the injury:

(c) arises out of the issuance, denial,
suspension, or revocation of, or by the
-4-

POINT III
SALT
LAKE
COUNTY'S
ENFORCEMENT OF THE
BUILDING CODE ORDERING PLAINTIFFS TO VACATE
THE PROPERTY NEARLY TEN MONTHS AFTER THE
EXPIRATION OF THE THIRTY DAY TEMPORARY
CERTIFICATE
OF
OCCUPANCY
DID NOT DENY
PLAINTIFFS
ANY
OF
THEIR
CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS.
At the request of the contractor Salt Lake County issued a
certificate of occupancy allowing occupancy of the building for
thirty days.
statements

At no time were any statements, conversations, or

made

to

plaintiffs

regarding

the

issuance

of a

temporary certificate of occupancy.
Based

in

part

upon

the

previously

issued

thirty

day

certificate of occupancy the plaintiffs elected to close their
purchase

of

the

building.

The

temporary

certificate

occupancy for the building was issued on condition
remaining
purchase

of

that all

requirements regarding the decision to finalize the
of

certificate

the
of

building

based

occupancy was

upon

solely

.Salt Lake County only represented

a temporary
that

thirty day

of the plaintiffs.

that the building could be

lawfully occupied for thirty days and during said time it was
to be completed and the requirements of the building code met.
Any
their

damages
own

actions,

assertions that
violate

suffered
not

by the plaintiffs
those

of

the

are

a result of

County.

Plaintiffs1

the County's enforcement of the building code

plaintiffs'

First,

Fifth

rights is fatuous.
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and

Fourteenth

Amendment

The enforcement
of

the

County's

of the building
police

power.

code is a lawful
not

a

exercise

deprivation

of

constitutional rights.
"A municipal corporation may prohibit
the use and occupancy of certain buildings,
where the prohibition
is justified as a
proper
exercise of the police power to
protect the public health, safety, welfare
and morals.
It may, for example, prohibit
the use or occupancy
of a building or
portion thereof for failure to comply with
the requirements of an ordinance, where the
owner or occupant fails, after notice to
make the building comply therewith."

"Unquestionably it is the official duty
of city officials charged with the responsibility
of
administering
and
enforcing
municipal building codes and ordinances to
discharge
that
responsibility
faithfully,
exercising sound judgment where discretion
is vested in them, but courts will not
interfere with their exercise of discretion
except for abuse thereof.
It has been held
that mandamus does not lie to compel a city
to enforce building regulations.
Moreover,
the
neglect
of
a municipality
and
its
officers
or
employees
to
enforce
the
detailed
provisions
of
a building
code
creates no civil liability to individuals."it
McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, 3rd Ed.,
§24.552. 554, pp. 233, 236.
POINT IV
THE SALT LAKE COUNTY PUBLIC WORKS DEPARTMENT IS NOT A LEGAL ENTITY THAT CAN SUE OR
BE SUED.

The

Public

Works

Department

of

Salt

Lake

County

is

a

department organized by Salt Lake County, a body corporate and
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EXHIBI'l

IN THE UTAH fUlPRFMP COURT

ROBERT J. DEBRY and JOAN
DEBRY,
Plaintiffs/Appellants,

BRIFF 01' APPELLANT:*

vs.
tlhLu
: NOBLE, Individually and in his capacity
as Chief Building Official
cf Salt Lake County; and
: *.L2 LAKE COUNTY ,

Supreme Court.
Case No ooo;1 l
Cnfrgor y li (Lj

..: us/ Respondents.
APPEAL FROM SUMMARY JUDGMENT GRANTED TW
THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
HONORABLE PAT B. BRIAN, JUDGE

EDWARD T .

WELLS -

AH22

ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants
4252 South 700 East
Salt Lake City, UT H4J07
Telephone: («»n 2t.2-89l5
PAUL G. MAUGHAN
DEPUTY SALT LAKE COUNTY ATTORNEY
Attorney for Defendants/Respondents
2001 South State St., S-3400
Salt Lake City, UT 84190-3421
Telephone: (801) 4G8-T4ro

v.

City

of

Independence,

445

U.S.

622

(1980);

Martinez

v.

California, 444 U.S. 277 (1980); Bateson v. Geisse, 857 F.2d 1300
(9th

Cir. 1988); Grandstaff v. City of Borcrer. 767 F.2d 161 (5th

Cir. 1985); Leverett v. Town of Limon, 567 F.Supp. 471 (D.Colo.
1983); Wilson v. Jackson, 505 A.2d 913 (Md. App. 1988).
B.

The Utah Governmental Immunity Act Does Not Bar the DeBrysf
Due Process Claims for Retaliation.
1.

Factual basis of the claim.
Even though the lower court did not determine whether

there were facts sufficient to establish a due process claim, there
is a factual basis for the claim summarized as follows:
The County issued a temporary certificate of occupancy
allowing the building to be occupied.

The temporary certificate

listed only a few items to be finished or corrected.
were hazardous or life threatening.
Noble depo. May 9, 1990 p. 110
p.

.");

None of them

(Deposition of Wallace R.

(hereinafter

"Noble depo. II

Deposition of Carl Eriksson April 23, 1990 pp. 94-96

(hereinafter "Eriksson depo. p.

. " ) . The Countyfs policy and

practice is to allow repairs to be made while the occupant remains
in possession of the building.
Eriksson depo. pp. 83-85.)

(Noble depo. II. pp. 104-105;

The County's policy is to also notify

the property owner of completion of the items listed on a temporary
certificate of occupancy is not proceeding at a satisfactory pace.
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'tie v *

ounean v.
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v

' o::es«;;

. ause

Louisiana,

(10th

Cir.

39]

^o-n

Onev v. Oklahoma City, 120 F.2d 261 (10th Cir. 1941); State v.
Phillips. 540 P.2d 936 (J. Maughn, dissenting Utah 1975).
Due process limits the governments ability to deprive an
individual of life, liberty or property.

Deshonev v. Winnebago

County Dept. of Social Services, 109 S. Ct. 998 (1989).

"Protec-

tion against arbitrary governmental action is the great purpose of
the due process clause."

Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114

(1889); Wilwording v. Swenson, 502 F.2d 844 (8th Cir. 1974).
Specifically, the 1st Amendment and the due process
clause

prohibit

the

government

from

retaliating

against

an

individual for exercising his constitutional rights. Blackridcre v.
Perry. 417 U.S. 21 (1971).
In this case, the DeBrys claimed that the County evicted
them from the building as retaliation for filing a notice of claim
with the County.
Presenting a notice of claim is protected speech for 1st
Amendment purposes,

see, Pickering v. Flacke. 453 N.Y.S.2d 1016,

1018 (N.Y.Supp. 1982).

Similarly, the DeBrys1 right to litigate is

protected by the 1st Amendment.

Laker Airways, Ltd. v. Pan

American World Airways, 604 F.Supp. 280 (D.D.C. 1984); Eilers v.
Palmer, 575 F.Supp. 1259 (D. Minn. 1984).
The DeBrys have the right to petition for redress without
the fear of retribution.

Simply put, neither the County nor Noble
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Video International Products Inc.

Warner Amex Cable Communications, Inc. , 8 58 F.2d 1 o7l.,
1988) .
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Similarly, whether Noble has qualified immunity from suit
in his personal capacity is also a fact question.
defense

of good

faith qualified

immunity

The common law

for a governmental

employee sued in his individual capacity applies when the defendant
performs his statutory duty honestly and in good faith.

Hiorth v.

Whittenburq, 241 P. 2d 907 (Utah 1952). Whether Noble performed his
duty honestly and in good faith are both questions of fact.
Smith v. Losee. 485 F.2d 334, 345 (10th Cir. 1973).

see,

The lower

court made no finding and there was no factual showing that Noble
performed his duties honestly and in good faith.
In summary, there is a factual issue as to whether the
County and Noble evicted the DeBrys as retaliation for the Debrys
exercising their 1st, 5th and 14th Amendment rights to petition
for redress of their grievances. There is also a factual issue as
to whether the DeBrys were deprived of their constitutional rights
pursuant to a practice or policy of the County.

The lower court

could not and did not resolve these fact issues. The court merely
ruled that the County and Noble are immune from the Debrys1
constitutional claims. However, there is no statutory immunity for
local government and its employee acting in his official capacity.
Moreover, whether Noble has qualified immunity from suit in his
individual capacity depends upon whether he acted honestly and in
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As a result of the Countyfs failure to enforce the law,
the DeBrys purchased a defective office building.
repair the building exceeds $333,515.

The cost to

In addition, the County

prevented the DeBrys from using the building. The additional rent
paid by the DeBrys totals over $351,6047.
2.

Legal analysis.
The due process clause prevents local government from

denying individuals a liberty or property interest without due
process of law.

Martinez v. California. 277 U.S. 279 (1980).

A

"property interest" for due process purposes "denotes a broad range
of interests that are secured by existing rules or understanding."
Celebrity Club, Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control Commission, 657 P.2d
1243, 1297 (Utah 1982). The property interests are defined broadly
because:
The spirit of enterprise which impels a person
to initiate and develop a business which
provides services to the public and employment
for others is vital to the common welfare. Id.
Specifically, the right to occupy a house or building is
a property right protected by the due process clause. Buchanan v.
Warlev, 245 U.S. 60 (1917); Polenz v. Parrott. 853 F.2d 551 (7th
Cir. 1989).

7

These figures were developed in testimony at trial of the main
action. Trial Transcript pp. 698, 845.
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